Global trade patterns are continuing to shift, and increasingly Eastward. As Gulf nations diversify and broaden their highly oil-dependent economies, ASEAN nations seem to be deepening theirs, focusing more on what they are good at while pursuing stability alongside.
In this vein, Vietnam and the United States are now closing in on what may become one of the most strategically important bilateral trade agreements either has attempted in decades. The pace has accelerated sharply in recent months, and Hanoi’s messaging has grown more confident. Deputy Prime Minister Trần Lưu Quang has stated that a deal could be signed “soon.”
Two features of the emerging agreement stand out as especially consequential. The first is the pursuit of structured reciprocity, a model far more formal (and couched in the language favored by President Trump) than previous phases of US–Vietnam engagement.
It follows five rounds of formal negotiations, working through tariff schedules, market-access conditions, enforcement procedures, customs transparency, and the macroeconomic concerns that have repeatedly strained the relationship.
For Washington, this means improved access for American agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and digital services. For Hanoi, it means the chance to lock in stable, predictable access to the world’s largest consumer market, free from the constant threat of anti-dumping investigations, ad-hoc tariff revisions, or political mood swings. Both sides have signaled a willingness to treat the relationship as mature enough for codified obligations rather than political improvisation.
The second is the macro-financial consultation mechanism. The US Treasury’s suspicion of Vietnam’s currency management has long lingered in the background, most visibly when Washington briefly labeled Hanoi a “currency manipulator” in 2020. One analysis suggests that an institutionalized review mechanism may be the single most effective stabilizer for foreign firms contemplating major supply-chain relocations to Vietnam. For a country that has attracted vast investment precisely because it offers predictability in an unpredictable region, this kind of instrument is invaluable.
Where this becomes far more significant is when placed against the broader sweep of Vietnam’s economic strategy over the past decade. The country’s leadership has made no secret of its ambition to emulate the path taken by East Asia’s previous generation of “tiger economies.” The basic components—export-driven industrialization, state modernization, selective openness, and careful hedging—have been visible for years.
Trying to combine economic liberalization with socialist principles is an idea that hinges upon strategic autonomy. That model in turn relies on a handful of pillars: stable access to wealthy markets, the steady upgrading of domestic manufacturing, and the attraction of high-value foreign investment. A rules-based trade agreement with the US reinforces all three.
First, it strengthens the demand environment for Vietnam’s electronics and semiconductor clusters, many of which now sit at the heart of Indo–Pacific supply-chain diversification. Second, it enhances Vietnam’s competitiveness relative to Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines—states that have pursued similar industrial upgrading but lack Vietnam’s combination of political stability and export discipline. And third, it encourages multinational firms to treat Vietnam not as a convenient “China-plus-one” fallback but as a long-term pillar of their production architecture. Data collected by Vietnam Export Data shows the depth of Vietnam’s export dependence on the United States. A treaty that insulates those flows from regulatory, fiscal, or political shocks gives Vietnam greater freedom to invest, plan, and transition into higher-value activities.
The regional implications extend beyond Vietnam’s borders. Washington’s Indo–Pacific strategy has steadily shifted toward a “latticework” of bilateral and minilateral partnerships: AUKUS with Australia and the UK, deepening semiconductor coordination with Japan, revived defense cooperation with the Philippines, and sector-specific integration with South Korea and India.
What has been missing is a credible economic instrument—something Washington has struggled to provide since the collapse of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. A durable trade pact with Vietnam is precisely the sort of arrangement that can anchor US engagement in the region on economic terms.
It also reinforces Vietnam’s approach to great-power politics. Hanoi’s long-standing doctrine has been a balancing act between East and West—engaging both Washington and Beijing while committing firmly to neither—yet this has gradually shifted toward a more confident form of strategic diversification. A trade agreement with the United States does not, in itself, imply a security alignment; but it does deepen Vietnam’s integration into the US-centered economic sphere, giving Hanoi more leverage when negotiating with Beijing and more autonomy in shaping its future.
The deal is still pending signatures, but the direction of travel is unmistakable. Five negotiation rounds, converging political messages, a jointly published framework, and the coordinated mobilization of domestic economic actors all point toward an agreement that is now more likely than not.
If concluded, it would not merely stabilize US–Vietnam trade. It would anchor Vietnam’s trajectory toward tiger-economy status, reinforce Pacific supply-chain realignments, and consolidate one of the region’s most quietly transformative partnerships.
The post Vietnam and the US at the Negotiating Table was first published by the Foundation for Economic Education, and is republished here with permission. Please support their efforts.
